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THE MEANING OF "THEFT" IN AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE
GEORGE TILTON
of the Denver Bar*

It is generally recognized that the "theft" provision in an
automobile insurance policy affords the owner protection from
loss or damage resulting to the car from a wrongful taking even
though the car itself is subsequently recovered. Where the car
has been found and returned to the owner, serious questions frequently arise as to whether any such damage to the car resulted
from a "theft" within the meaning of the policy. This problem
will be considered in three different types of factual situations:
First, injuries to a car after it has been taken by a "joyrider";
second, damage inflicted after a larceny by a bailee; and third,
damage occurring after the policy holder has been, by fraud, deprived of both title to and possession of his car. Because the particular wording of the policy will of course be a factor in any
decision on the coverage of the policy, an examination will be
made at the outset of the commonly used provisions together with
the rules applied in construing them.
For many years insurance policies covering the theft of automobiles ordinarily contained the words "theft, robbery and pilferage" as being those acts against which the owner of the car
or other person having an insurable interest therein is protected.
Today, however, most policies have included with the above terms
the word "larceny", thus reading, "to pay for loss of or damage
caused by theft, larceny, robbery or
to the automobile . . ..
Before 1941 insurers of automobiles considerably
pilferage."
narrowed their coverage by what is known as the "trick or device" clause, which precludes the insurer from being liable when
the "insured, or anyone acting under the express or implied authority of the insured, voluntarily parts with title or possession,
whether or not induced so to do by any fraudulent scheme, trick,
device or false pretense." Although the "trick or device" clause
is still in use, it is only occasionally found in the automobile insurance policies issued in Colorado today. But since its absence is
as much a factor in any suit on a policy as its presence, its effect
will be mentioned herein from time to time. Another clause once
frequently used, but rarely inserted at the present time, excludes
loss or damage from theft, etc., by anyone in the insured's household, service, or employment. The only exclusion being currently
used which is relevant to this paper relieves the insurer from liability under the theft provision "while the automobile is subject
to any bailment, lease, conditional sale, mortgage or other incumbrance not specifically declared and described in this policy."
Rules of construction have also played an important part in
*Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.

DICTA

April, 1952

actions brought on such policies. One such rule which has been
consistently applied is that where the policy is susceptible of more
than one meaning, that meaning most favorable to the insured
must be adopted.' Another rule almost as extensively adhered
to is that the word "theft" must be construed in light of its common and ordinary usage. 2 A third rule sometimes used, growing
out of this second rule of construction is to the effect that the
word "theft" in the policy does not include all offenses which
fall within statutory definitions of "larceny", the explanation
being that the words "theft" and "larceny" are not equivalents,
that while the word "theft" is to be construed as it is understood
by the ordinary man on the street, the meaning of "larceny" is
to be obtained from the wording of state statutes.
JOY-RIDING
The validity and application of the rule of construction last
mentioned can best be considered in connection with the problem
of the coverage in an automobile insurance policy, of loss or
damage resulting from "joy-riding." That offense has come to
mean the taking of an automobile, with the owner's consent, with
the sole intent of using it as the occasion may demand and subsequently relinquishing possession. It does not have as one of
its elements the animus furandi as do the more traditional offenses
of larceny and embezzlement, and such offense was unknown at
common law. While it may have been that the word "theft" as
understood by reasonable men would not have included "joy-riding" before the general adoption of statutes prohibiting such acts,
does it follow that the theft provision of an automobile insurance
does not now afford protection against joy-riding after such statutory provisions are generally in effect? In short, would the average
policy holder today use the term "theft" conversationally only after
turning to Mr. Blackstone?
In the New York case of Van Vechten v. Insurance Co.,3 decided in 1925, Cardozo seemed to answer the above questions in
the affirmative, and recovery was denied for damages sustained
to the insured's car by a joy-rider. Although there was in existence in New York at the time a statute making joy-riding a crime
and punishable as larceny, the court considered that the average
policyholder, in reading his policy, would not believe himself protected against an offense which was daily being committed against
automobile owners. The court held that a statute such as this
which affixed the name of an old crime to a new combination of
events does not require a like extension of the meaning of the
word "theft" in the insurance policy. While there may have been
'James v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 75 Colo. 209, 225 P. 213 (1924); Baker
v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 122 P. 2d 710 (1942); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Boyd ......... Fla.__
45 So. 2nd 499 (1950).
'Allen v. Berkshire Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 453, 168 A. 698 (1933);
Penn. Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F. 2d 774 (1941).
'239 N.Y. 303, 146 N.E. 432 (1925).
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a sound basis for such a conclusion when joy-riding statutes were
relatively novel, one might seriously question whether the same
result would obtain today after most, if not all, of the states have
laws defining joy-riding as a crime.
Where a similar policy was involved in the case of James v.
Phoenix Assurance Co.,4 the Colorado Supreme Court held, in

1924, that joy-riding does constitute a theft. A 1919 statute 5
had described joy-riding as a misdemeanor, whereas an earlier
statute 6 had provided that "any person who, without the consent
of the owner, shall take .

.

.

. any automobile shall be deemed

guilty of larceny and punished accordingly." It was contended
by counsel for the insurer that the 1919 statute repealed the earlier
statute so that joy-riding no longer constituted larceny, and hence
was not a theft within the meaning of the insurance policy. The
court, however, dismissed this argument, saying:
We do not regard the law of 1919 as making an essential change in the offense. It is true that the first act
is made a misdemeanor merely, but that does not remove
it from the definition of larceny as used in the statute.
Section 6738, C. L. 1921, makes larceny of a thing
of the value not exceeding $20.00, a misdemeanor. It is
therefore evident that the making of the first offense a
misdemeanor merely does not remove the act from the
class covered by the term "larceny." The word "theft"
has a very general meaning, and we are of the opinion
that interpreting the language of the policy according
to the ordinary meaning of the word, the act in question
should be held to have been a theft, for the purposes of
this suit.
Six years later the James case was affirmed by Employers
Fire Insurance Co. v. Bartee,7 where it was held that there need
be no intent to steal in order that the insurer be liable on its policy
protecting against "theft, robbery or pilferage."
Thus we find a New York court and a Colorado court confronted with the question of whether an insured whose car has
been damaged through another's joy-riding may recover for such
damage on a policy offering protection against "theft, robbery
or pilferage." In both the Van Vechten and James cases the rule
that theft must be read in the policy as the average man would
read it, was applied. Yet the two courts reached opposite results.
There is no doubt but that the New York court chose to walk
down the wrong path, because, as previously stated, the ordinary
policyholder does not look to the criminal definitions or the word
"theft" for the meaning he attributes to it. However, the harsh
rule laid down by Mr. Justice Cardozo has been somewhat allevi'75 Colo. 209, 225
Colo. Stat. Ann.,
'Colo. Stat. Ann.,
' 87 Colo. 147, 285

P. 213 (1924).
Chap. 16, § 21 (1935).
Chap. 48, § 94 (1935).
P. 756 (1930).
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ated through the decision of Block v. Standard Insurance Co.,8
decided in 1944. There, upon a similar set of facts to those in
the Van Vechten case, the New York court allowed recovery by
the insured for the reason that the word "larceny", in addition
to the words "theft, robbery or pilferage," was contained in the
policy upon which the action was brought.
ANY UNAUTHORIZED TAKING

Another Colorado case dealing with the nature of the taking
under the theft provision of the policy deserves consideration.
In Union Insurance Society of Canton v. Robertson,9 the facts
were that the insured's son received permission from his father
to use the latter's car for the evening, but no authorization was
given the son by his father to allow anyone else to drive the car.
Later on in the evening the son was at a party where he and a
friend agreed to drive home a young lady, also present. But before
the mission was accomplished, the insured's son passed out at an
apartment by reason of his being intoxicated, whereupon his
friend, who had also been drinking but was not in the same condition as the insured's son, took the ignition keys to the insured's
automobile and proceeded to drive the young lady to her residence,
and the car was damaged while the friend was driving from the
young lady's home address to the place where he had left his own
automobile. Plaintiff brought suit on the theory that the son's
friend, in taking the car without authorization, had committed
a theft and that, therefore, the insurance company was liable for
the damages incurred while the car was in the friend's possession.
After a verdict for plaintiff was had in the trial court, the defendant appealed. On appeal then, the issue was whether there need
be only an unauthorized taking of the insured's automobile, or
whether there must also be present some criminal aspect in such
taking. The court decided against the plaintiff and reversed the
trial court. After noting the Colorado statute entitled "Larceny
of Motor Vehicles" 10 requires that "Any person who, without the
consent of the owner, shall take, use, operate or remove ....
an automobile" must act ". . . . for his own profit, use or purpose" before he shall be deemed guilty of larceny, it was held that
under the particular facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, the friend in taking the automobile had done what common
decency had required and had only completed what had been a
joint undertaking with the insured's son. Therefore, if necessary,
the court stated, the insured's consent would be implied.
Thus we see that although an intent to steal is not required,
a mere unauthorized taking, in itself, is not sufficient to permit
recovery under the policy from the insurer for damage to or loss
' 292 N.Y. 270, 54 N.W. 2d 821, 152 A.L.R. 1097.
' 88 Colo. 590, 298 P. 1064 (1931).
,o Colo. Stat. Ann., Chap. 48, § 94 (1935).
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of the car caused by theft. By virtue of the Robertson case, it
must be demonstrated clearly that the person obtaining the automobile without the owner's consent, had a motive which was not
in any way connected with or related to the rightful possessor's
plans. Unless the taker's independent "profit, use or purpose" is
apparent, the insured will not prevail against his insurance company.
Of course, recovery is also precluded, regardless of the taker's
motive, where he or she is a member of the insured's household
or in the insured's service or employment, when the acts of such
person are excluded in the policy.
LARCENY BY BAILEE

The second situation to be discussed is concerned with the
rights of the policy holder against his insurer when the automobile has been the subject of a bailment and the bailee subsequently
makes off with the automobile.
Such an act by a bailee in Colorado would lead to criminal
prosecution on a charge of larceny by bailee, provided an animus
furandi has been found present at the taking. Whether such an
act would be included under the protection given in an automobile
theft insurance policy issued in Colorado has not been determined.
In other jurisdictions, however, it has been held that the act of
a bailee of an automobile in stealing the same should be considered theft within the meaning of the policy." While one might
conceivably argue that larceny by a bailee of an automobile should
not be included within the definition of theft, such an argument
could only be made when the policy provision in question omits
the word "larceny". Even though such an omission is assumed,
any contention that theft, as used in the policy, would not comprehend the crime of larceny by bailee seems erroneous. Granting
that the crime of larceny by bailee is purely a creature of statute,
it must be remembered that the joy-riding statute is also unknown
to the common law, yet recovery for damage by theft, robbery or
pilferage, because of the violation of the latter statute, has been
allowed in this state. And the same reasoning used to uphold the
insurer's liability for loss due to joy-riding is equally applicable
to the insured's right to have his insurance company bear the loss
resulting from the larceny of his automobile by a bailee thereof.
For whether possession of the car when stolen was in its owner
or the wrongdoer himself, the average policyholder would definitely believe that a theft of his car had occurred. Therefore, there
would seem to be no valid objection possible to the proposition
that a larceny of the insured car by its bailee constitutes a "theft"
within the terms of the automobile insurance policy. But when
uAlilen v. Berkshire Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 453, 163 A. 689 (1933);
Gulf Finance & Security Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 7 La App. 8 (1928).
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the "trick or device" clause has been written into said policy, the
loss or damage due12to a larceny by bailee has been held not within
the policy's terms.
LOSS BY FRAUDULENT MEANS

The last situation to be dealt with involves the liability of
the insurer when the automobile is lost by reason of a third person's fraud. A commonly occurring example of this last situation
is the relinquishment of the title and possession of his car by
an insured in exchange for a check, later found to be worthless.
Where a "trick or device" clause is present within the policy, the
owner of the car is usually precluded from recovery. But in the
absence of such a clause the courts are divided on the question
of the insurer's liability. Those authorities which refuse to hold
for the policyholder in his action against the insurance company,
distinguish between larceny, where only possession of the thing
is obtained, and a swindle where, in addition to possession, title
is also procured. 13 In Cedar Rapids National Bank v. American
Surety Co. of N'ew York,' 4 a leading case denying liability of the
insurance company, it was said:
On the other hand, if the wrongdoer fraudulently induced the injured party to surrender to him, not simply
the temporary possession of the property, but the absolute title to and possession of the property, then his
offense is that of obtaining property by false pretense,
and not that of larceny.
But in Arkansas, where a criminal statute provides that one
who obtains property by means of a false pretence shall be guilty
of larceny, recovery by the insured is allowed. 15 In Rhode Island,
where the common law distinction between the two crimes has
been abolished, the insurance policy has been held to cover a loss
of title and possession of the automobile because of fraud.1 6 Also,
an Oregon court, in ruling against the insurance company, pointed
out that the statute of that state concerned with the obtaining
of goods or chattels by false pretenses did not specifically name
the crime, but only
defined the act and prescribed the punishment
7
for its violation.
"Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co . ....... Minn .........
46 N.W. 2d
868 (1951). But see, Gibson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 117 W. Va. 156, 184
S.E. 562 (1936).
12Royal Insurance Co. v. Jack, 113 Ohio St. 153, 148 N.E. 923 (1925);
Cedar Rapids National Bank v. American Surety Co., 197 Iowa 878, 195 N.W.
253 (1923) ; Thompson v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Co., 203 Okla. 530, 223 P.
2d 757 (1951).
14
See note 11, supra.
"Central. Surety Fire Corporation v. Williams, 213 Arkansas 600, 211
S.W. 2d 891 (1948).'
"Brady v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 47 R. I. 416, 133 A. 799 (1926).
"Nugent v. Union Automobile Insurance Co., 140 Oregon 161, 13 P. 2d 343
(1932).
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Thus, those jurisdictions which have, in one way or another,
done away with the difference at common law between the two
offenses, tend to permit a recovery under the theft provision of
an automobile insurance policy by policyholders who have been
victimized by swindlers, while the states still adhering to the
common law definitions of larceny and obtaining property through
false pretenses refuse to consider the latter crime as "theft" or
"larceny" as these terms are found in the policy.
A very recent Missouri case,' where this issue was one of
first impression, and where obtaining goods by false pretenses still
constitutes a crime by that name, decided for the insurer, saying:
We have concluded, however, that the common meaning of the words "theft" and "larceny" still carry with
them some element of trespass and that neither were
meant to apply where the owner gives the property to
a malefactor with the. intention of passing title.
As of yet, the question has not been settled in Colorado, but
obtaining somesince the orthodox distinction between larceny and
9
is a strong
there
state,
this
in
thing by false pretenses exists
an insured
deny
likewise
will
court
supreme
our
that
possibility
any satisfaction from his insurance company on account of the
insured being bilked into giving up both the title to and possession
of his automobile.

APPEAL
FLOYD MILES
of the Denver Ber

The Lawyer's lot is not so hot and yet he can endure,
The slings outrageous Fortune flings to plague the meek and
poor.
Fire, floor nor Acts of God will yet his temper sway,
Nor all the tricks the fiends of Hell can shuffle in his way.
But if you want to see him squirm in stark unfeigned despair,
Cut paper dolls, beat his wife, pour sheep dip in his hairAs Louis XII would slit the throats of seneschal and minion.
Just let the Court say on appeal-"AFFIRMED WITHOUT
OPINION."
"Cox v. World Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 239 S.W. 2d 538 (1952).

'9Housh v. the People, 24 Colo. 262, 50 P. 1036, (1897); 2 Melville on Criminal Law in Colo. 192.
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RELATIVE RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE AND
BENEFICIARY TO LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
JAMES L. TILLEY*

There is possibly no other aspect of insurance law which has
caused so much uncertainty as that of the right to assign a policy
of life insurance and the relative rights acquired by an assignee
and those retained by the beneficiary of the policy. A study of
the many cases on the point would give the impression that there
is a complete lack of consistency upon the subject as viewed by
various courts. Of the attempts which have been made to organize
this chaos, none has been found which is adequate to simplify
the problem and show constancy. For, example, in his Treatise on
Insurance, Vance has stated that the conflict of decisions is more
apparent than real, and he has offered an outline based on the
nature and effect, or intended effect, of the assignment itself.
Within this outline, Vance shows that the courts are quite consistent (with the normal number of dissenters), but the outline
itself is admittedly confined to policies wherein the right of the
insured to make the assignment is not questioned. This narrowing,
of course, so limits the applicability of the outline that the value
of its simplicity and uniformity of opinion is greatly diminished.
This paper will deal with the broader coverage of the problem.
WHEN THE RIGHT TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY IS NOT RESERVED

When the insured has himself made application for the policy,
paid the premiums thereon, and designated the person or persons
to whom the proceeds are to be paid, it might seem at the outset
that the right of the insured to assign the policy would be beyond
dispute. However, the beneficiary so designated is the recipient
of rights arising from a contract between the insured and the
carrier, and the contract rules which apply to third party beneficiaries will obtain.
If the policy contains no reservation to the insured of the
right to change the beneficiary, then the rights of the named
beneficiary are, by the courts of this country, almost unanimously
declared to be "vested rights" in the proceeds from the moment of
the issuance of the policy. Thus, these rights are protected from
infringement even by action of the insured. This creation of indefeasible rights in a donee beneficiary is not recognized in most
foreign nations, where the general rule is that the insured retains
complete control over the policy and may use, surrender, or assign
it as he sees fit. Further, it is not wholly justifiable even in the
United States, for in the leading third party beneficiary case of
Lawrence v. Fox,1 there was some doubt as to whether the prom* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
120 N. Y. 268 (1859).
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isee could have released the promisor. This uncertainty is referred
to by Vance 2 who points out that the third party beneficiary
concept,
By no means necessitates the conclusion that
the designation of a person as beneficiary of a conditional promise to pay money at a future date gives the
person a vested right in the promise. It is wholly a question of the promisee's intent. He may intend to retain
entire control over the benefit of the promise until his
death and that the beneficiary shall take nothing until
that event, or that the beneficiary shall assume a present
right to demand in future performance of the promisor,
reserving to himself, however, the power to extinguish
that right at will, or he may intend to make an irrevocable gift by way of declaration of trust. In the case of insurance contracts, this intent may be clearly expressed,
as where an express trust in favor of the beneficiary is
declared, but it is usually necessary to determine it by
implication from the words of the contract taken in connection with the circumstances under which it was made.
An acceptable historical explanation of this "vested right"
theory which is peculiar to the United States may be found in
various state statutes whereby the beneficiary gradually gained
more security of position. Such statutes were designed to preserve for the insured's widow and children, when designated as
beneficiaries, the proceeds of the insurance policy free from any
claims of the creditors of the insured. With this statutory guide,
the courts were not slow in going further in protecting the beneficiary from the insured himself. This innovation comes from
Bliss in his treatise on insurance wherein he states:
We apprehend the general rule to be that a policy,
and the money to become due under it, belong the moment
it is issued to the person or persons named in it as the
beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that there is no power in
the person the insurance by any act of his, or hers, by deed
or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of
the person named. The person designated in the policy is
the proper person to receipt for and sue for the money.
The legal representatives of the insured have no claim
upon the money and cannot maintain an action therefor,
if it is expressed to be for the benefit of some one else.
The cases relied upon by Bliss in support of this "general
rule" did not sustain it; nevertheless, in 1888, no less authority
language
than the United States Supreme Court adopted
4 the exact
above, citing Bliss as authority for the rule.
2 Vance,

'BLISS,

The Beneficiary in Life Insurance, 31 Yale L.J. 348-9.
INSURANCE 496 (1872).

4Washington Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888).
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The principle has since been accepted in all the states 5 except Wisconsin, in those cases where no right is reserved in the
policy to change the beneficiary. Whether the rights of the beneficiary in such policies be designated vested or contingent, the
beneficiary may assign and his assignee may receive whatever
rights the beneficiary had.; One might question this result on
the ground that the beneficiary can defeat by assignment the very
protection which the insured sought to establish for such beneficiary.'
The beneficiary being the "owner" of the policy where the
insured has not reserved therein the right to change beneficiaries,
it follows that an assignee of the insured would take nothing as
against the beneficiary or an assignee of the beneficiary.
WHEN THE RIGHT TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY IS RESERVED

Ordinarily, when the insured reserves to himself the right to
change the beneficiary of his life insurance, the exercise of his
right of ownership, whether by change of beneficiary, assignment,
or surrender, would seem to be safe from attack, unless the attack
be as to the validity of the change, assignment, or surrender. This
would seem to be the case, at least, if the right is exercised in
strictest compliance with the terms of the policy. In this manner
it would be possible to destroy the entire interest of the revocable
beneficiary, who has no vested interest, but only an expectancy,
the policy itself being the measure of the beneficiary's rights.8
The Colorado courts, however, have not accepted this view,
for this state apparently recognizes no interest as a "contingency"
unless something more than the latent power of the insured to
change the beneficiary stands between the beneficiary and an absolute right. Rather, the Colorado courts regard the interest as
vested, subject to divestmentf The practical aspects of this difference in terminology are considered below.
The problem arises when insured fails to divest, in proper
form, the rights of such a revocable beneficiary. For example,
many policies provide for assignment procedure, but fail to make
clear whether the revocable beneficiary must join in the assignment, as he would have to if his beneficiary status were irrevocable.
That an assignment is not, per se, a change of beneficiary seems
well settled in several jurisdictions, including Colorado. 10 As the
5The leading Colorado case is Anderson v. Grossbeck, 26 Colo. 3, 55 P. 1086
Sheets v. Sheets, 4 Colo. App. 450, 36 P. 310 (1905).
Collins v. Dawley, 4 Colo. 138 (1878).
Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Calif, 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Shay v. Merchants
Banking Trust Co., 335 Pa. 101, 6 A. 2d 536 (1939); Davis v. Modern Industrial
Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E. 2d 639 (1939).
'Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414; Viles v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 124 Fed. 78 (1942).
"Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414 (1913); Muller
v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 Colo. 245, 161 P. 148 (1916).
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court pointed out in Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Swett,"
The assignment of a policy and a change of beneficiary are not the same, but different things. As assignment is the transfer by one of his right or interest in
property to another. It rests upon contract, and, generally speaking, the delivery of the thing assigned is necessary to its validity. The power to change the beneficiary
is the power to appoint. The power of appointment
must be exercised in the manner agreed upon in the contract of insurance.
Therefore, when the insured, acts alone in executing an assignment or in making a surrender, under a policy which does
not state whether the current beneficiary must also be a signatory,
the effectiveness of the surrender or of the rights acquired by
the assignee (and, of course, of the beneficiary) are certainly
open to question. Many cases can be cited which hold that such
a surrender is binding upon a beneficiary 12 or that as between
the beneficiary and the assignee, the assignee has the superior
right.' 3 These rulings were justified by saying that the form of
the assignment was substantially the same as a change of beneficiary, and operated as such a change, 14 or by declaring that the
insured is the actual owner of the policy and the mere expectancy
of the beneficiary may be destroyed through the action of the
owner. 15
COLORADO FOLLOWS MINORITY RULE

Though the above may be termed the majority rule, it is
apparently not the law in Colorado, which follows the New Jersey
rule that the assignee can receive only those rights which remain
in the insured, and cannot gain a right superior to that of the
beneficiary. Therefore, a surrender form executed by the insured
alone is no protection to the insurer 16 and a docket of Assignee
17
v. Beneficiary would result in judgment for the defendant.
Perhaps these two rules are not so divergent as may appear.
If the assignee takes, under the Colorado rule, all rights which
"222 F. 200 (CCA Mich. 1915).
"Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 103 P. 2d 963 (1940)
Decker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94 Utah 166, 76 P. 2d 568 (1938); Morgan v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 94 F. 2d 129 (CCA.Mo. 1938); Neilson v. General
American Life Inc. Co., 89 F. 2d 90 (CCA N.M. 1937).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co., v. Phillips, 60 F. 2d 901 (CCA Okla. 1934); Petty v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 235 Iowa 455. 15 N.W. 2d 613 (1944); Rawls v. Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 253 F. 725 (CCA Fla. 1918). Count!ess citations to this point are
available, but. the persuasive effect of r.he numbers is somewhat lessened by the
fact that in many of the cases, the policy involved specifically permitted assignment or surrender by the insured alone.
1 Merchant's Bank %.Garrard, 158 Ga. 867, 124 S.E. 715 (1924).
Rawls v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., snpra. note 13.
Hill v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 91 Colo. 300. 14 P. 2d 1006 (1932).
Muller v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., sitpra, nete 10.
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were in the insured, this should include the right to change the
beneficiary. 18 If, indeed, such right is transferred by the insured
to the assignee, then it would appear that by the simple act on
the part of such assignee of entering a change of beneficiary,
naming himself in that capacity, that could be accomplished indirectly which could not be done directly. This point is virtually
conceded in a Colorado case, 19 and would thus narrow the gap
between the majority rule and the New Jersey and Colorado rules.
Is the Colorado rule founded upon an insistence upon such a
formality?
Moreover, the Colorado rule does little to protect the beneficiary (if that is the intent and purpose of the rule) except in
the event that the insured in making the assignment fails to
comply with the technical requirements of filing a proper change
of beneficiary naming the assignee. This brings up the question
of whether such change of beneficiary is required either of the
assignor-insured or of the assignee if the beneficiary under the
policy was designated as the estate of the insured. Clearly, any
assignee, revocable or irrevocable, who joins in the assignment
cannot then be heard to complain of such assignment. When an
insured has assigned his interest under a policy naming his estate
as beneficiary, is there included in that act the consent of the
estate? If the insured cannot consent for and on behalf of his
estate, who can? 20
EXTENT OF ASSIGNMENT

Assuming that an insured has complied with all of the requirements to give the assignee superior rights to the beneficiary,
either by having the beneficiary join in the assignment, or by a
formal change of beneficiary, or through the procedure of declaring his estate as beneficiary (if that does free him to assign better
rights to the assignee), there still remains the question as to the
rights as between the assignee and the beneficiary if the insured
did not intend that the assignee should take all the proceeds. From
the above discussion, it can be seen that an assignment of a life
insurance policy is not free from complications and opportunities
for fraud, for normally the assignor-insured has departed this
life when the issue arises. Here the nature and intended effect
of the assignment begins to be the important factor in determining
rights of the claimants, as opposed to the nature of the policy, or
time and circumstances of the assignment.
It must be conceded, however, that assignment immediately
after issuance to one with no insurable interests raises the ques"In this c(mlnection, .s'e Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., R,(prl, note 10
ld.
For an interesting discussion of this problem, Vrr Rahe v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 103 Colo. 241, 85 P. 2d 725 (1938).
,
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tion of whether the assign is part of a scheme of wager or speculation on human life.
The major divisions of such assignments are generally accepted.2 1 They are: (1) Conditional Assignments to secure creditors; (2) Absolute Assignments; and, (3) Pretended Assignments.
Conditional Assignments to Secure Creditors.
This popular assignment may be made to secure debts due, or
advances to be made. Although such an assignment may appear
absolute on its face, the fact that it was only conditional may
freely be shown.2 2 Such assignments must qualify under the rules
of pledges, which require that:
a. Legal title must remain in the pledgor. Clearly the assignee takes only the rights in the policy held by the insuredassignor, and the assignee's claim is subject to whatever equities
or defenses would have prevailed against the assignor.
b. The pledgee must have a lien on the property for the payment of a debt or the performance of an obligation due him by
the pledgor. The lien of the assignee of a life insurance policy
is held to be a right to reimbursement from the proceeds of a
sum equal to the amount of the debt secured, plus any premiums
paid by him, and interest thereon. Although as between the assignee and the insurer, the assignee is entitled to all of the proceeds, he holds the excess over the amount due him in trust for the
bneficiaries or the personal representatives of the decedent. '
The assignee of such a policy normally need show no insurable
interest aside from the debt itself, and he may collect on the policy
even though the debt itself be uncollectable because of expiration
2 4
of the statute of limitations or due to discharge in bankruptcy.
c. Possession of the pledged property must pass from the
pledgor to the pledgee. Apparently, this does not mean that physical transfer of the policy must occur, for even in the jurisdictions which hold this an essential element of the security assignment, any writing in the hands of the assignee which evidences
that such an assignment
was made will generally constitute sub2
stantial delivery. 5
Absolute Assignment.
An absolute assignment may be made to a volunteer beneficiary. Any time that a beneficiary or assignee is designated
" Vance on lnsitrance, sec. 129 (1951).
22.For cases, see VANCE 764, n.6.
3

Bosma v. Evans, 96 Colo. 504, 44 P. 2d 511 (1935); Allen v. Home Nat.
Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498 (1935) ; Detroit Life Ins. Co. v. Linsenmier, 241
Mich. 608, 217 N.W. 919 (1928).
"Mercer Nat. Bank v. White's Ex'r., 236 Ky. 128, 32 S.W. 2d 734 (1930);
Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 140, 185 S.E. 648
(1936).
' Muller v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, note 10; N.W. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 153 Wisc. 252, 140 N.W. 1078 (1938) ; Weaver v. Weaver, 182
Ill.
287, 55 N.E. 338 (1898).
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who is not one of the natural objects of the insured's bounty, the
ugly head of suspicion appears, and the possibility of a wager
on human life is raised. However, there seems to be no valid
reasoni to deny an insured the right to designate, by appropriate
means as set forth in the insurance contract, any person as beneficiary. The right to so designate certainly exists at the time of
application for the policy, and the mere passage of time would
not seem sufficient to deny or curtail the exercise of that right.
If such a designation appears to be simply a tardy selection of
a beneficiary, it is allowable in all jurisdictions except Texas,
where any beneficiary must be shown to have an insurable interest,
as though he himself were the actor in procuring the policy2 6
An absolute assignment may also be made to purchasers for
value. The same objection as above applies here, but the federal
courts, and some 28 of the state courts, as well as those in the
English and Canadian jurisdictions permit an honest sale by the
27
insured without a showing of insurable interest in the purchaser.
Of the remaining states, six disallow such transfer on the grounds
of public policy, although five of these (Texas again dragging her
feet) permit the designation of a beneficiary without such an
interest, which would seem to accomplish the same general purpose. 28 Moreover, most of these same courts will recognize this
"anti-public policy" assignment to the extent of regarding it as
though it were a collateral assignment, and thus
will permit the
2 9
assignee to collect his legitimate expenditures.
Pretended Assignments.
As a link between these sections, the words of Allen, J., of
the Massachusetts bench of 1884, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen
(no relation),3° on the subject of whether or not an assignee need
have an insurable interest, are quite apt:
The other objection urged is, that such transaction
may lead to gaming contracts . . . . Most contracts have
an element of gambling in them. There is uncertainty
in the value of any contract to deliver property at a
future day, and great uncertainty in the present value
of an annuity for a particular life, or of a sum payable
in the event of a particular death, and such contracts and
rights are often used for gambling purposes. The quesManhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 139 S.W. 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)
Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. 2d 500 (CCA Tex. 1941).
11See cases collected in 73 A.L.R. 1036.
25See Metcalf v. Montgomery, 229 Ala. 156, 155 So. 582 (1934) where the
Alabama court refused to attempt to justify this distinction.

-Metcalf

v. Montgomery, supra. note 28; Matthews v. Matthews, 163 Kan.

755, 186 P. 2d 233 (1947) ; Irons v. United States Life Ins. Co., 128 Ky. 640, 108

S.W. 904 (1908); Schneider v. Kohler, 201 S.W. 499 (Mo. App. 1947); Werenzinske v. Prudential Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 83, 14 A. 2d 279 (1940);

Ins. Co. v. Cohen, si pra, note 26.
"138 Mass. 24 (1884).
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tion is whether the right to a sum of money, payable on
the death of a person under a contract in the form of an
insurance policy, has any special character or quality
which renders it less assignable than the right to a sum
payable at the death of the same person under any other
contract or assurance, or than a remainder in real estate
expectant on such death.
The charitable misnomer of "pretended assignments" refers,
of course to wagering assignments wherein the "assignee" gambles
on a life which he could not insure directly. Just which of the
parties is doing the most gambling is open to question, for a hale
and hearty insured might be regarded bitterly as a "wasting
asset" in the eyes of the assignee who holds a double indemnity
policy, and the possibilty of outmaneuvering the mortality tables
cannot be entirely discounted. Nonetheless, some of history's
notorious sell-outs would wince at their greed in the presence
of one easy-going chap who sold the right to gamble against his
longevity for "a dollar or two and a supply of whisky." 31
Such wagering contracts are regarded with pious tongueclucks in nearly all jurisdictions, but it is sometimes a different
matter when one reaches court. Since the true actor in the affair
is the pretended assignee, it follows the basic rules of contracts
to declare such a transaction void, both as to the assignment and
as to the policy itself. And indeed, in some jurisdictions it is so
held, so long as the action is against the insurer by either the
beneficiary or the assignee,3 2 but when those two meet in the
forum, the insurer having paid one or having paid into court, only
the assignment is held to be invalid and the policy valid, 33 presumably upon the theory that if the insurer does not object to
the fraud, the courts will overlook it also. Since the assignment
is invalid, can the family of the insured reap the monetary harvest? Ah, not so, for the gambler-assignee is entitled to be reimbursed for his expenses.3 4 The theory of this result is explained
after a fashion in Finnie v. Walker : as follows:
The theory . . . . seems to be that the assignment
is said to be good as a designation of an appointee to
receive payment from the insurance company, and as a
security for advancements. The illegality is in the attempt of the assignee to retain entire proceeds.
Thus we have circumscribed the matter and find ourselves going out the door through which we entered, for this is the rationale
of the first type of assignment discussed, i. e., the conditional
assignment to secure creditors, past, present, or future.
"Nat'l. Life Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 97 Va. 167, 33 S.E. 539 (1899).
" See cases cited in VANCE on INSURANCE 769, n. 32.
11Ibid, at n. 33.
" Ibid, at n. 34.
"257 F. 698 (CCA N.Y. 1919).
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PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY IN
COLORADO
STANTON D. ROSENBAUM*

This article deals with the interpretation the Colorado courts
have given to total and permanent disability insurance clauses.
Consideration will not be given to the application of the clause
to any specific type of disease or injury, except insofar as
it pertains to the general problem. Because of the variations in
the clauses themselves and in the circumstances of the individual
cases, it is impogsible to reduce the Colorado decisions upon this
subject to a definite formula. The type of policy provision to be
considered is usually termed a non-occupational or general disability policy. It indemnifies against total and permanent disability which prevents the insured from working. He is insured
as a man, not as a particular workman. He may recover only
upon proof that he is disabled from engaging in any gainful
occupation. This type of coverage may be included as an adjunct
to life insurance entitling insured to waiver of premiums and to
benefit payments. There is also a general accident and health
policy written by casualty insurance companies. The courts, in
dealing with the question, make no distinction between disability
clauses in accident policies and life insurance policies, so no such
distinction will here be attempted.
A typical disability clause which has been before the Colorado
Supreme Court on several occasions is the following: 1
Benefits will be paid when insured has become totally
disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring after the issuance of this agreement, so as to be
prevented thereby from engaging in any business or
occupation and performing any work for compensation,
gain or profit ....
Colorado follows the liberal rule, and weight of authority,
that the total disability contemplated by an accident policy, or
a life insurance policy containing a disability clause, does not
mean a state of absolute helplessness. The total disability contemplated means inability to do all the substantial and material
acts necessary to the prosecution of the insured's business, in his
customary and usual manner.
In considering this subject, full regard must be had for the
fact that the actions involved were not in tort for damages but
were brought on the policy as a contract containing certain specific
terms and provisions and will be construed strongly against the
* Student University of Denver College of Law.
'This clause was found in policies issued by the Guardian Life Insurance
Company prior to 1950. The clause presently used by that company together
with reasons for the modification are set out later in this paper.
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insurer. The courts have recognized the fact that the purpose of
the policy is to indemnify the insured against disability and subsequent loss of 2wages and have construed the policy liberally
toward that end.
In the type of policy under consideration the most frequent
problem is the meaning of "total and permanent" disability. If
this phrase were to be construed strictly, it would mean that the
insured must be reduced to a state of coma or absolute paralysis.
In United States Casualty Co. v. Hanson,3 the Colorado court held
that neither party would intend such an interpretation.
In one of the first Colorado cases on this subject, the insurance
company maintained insured was not disabled because he was
able to make visits to his doctor and go out doors. The could held 4
that "the plaintiff might have been able to walk, he might have
been able to ride on the cars to his physician's office, and still be
entirely incapacitated for work or business." In that case insured
didn't carry on any part of his business. Going a step further,
there is presented the situation where insured is physically able.
to attend to a very minor part of his affairs.
EXTENT OF DISABILITY REQUIRED

In United States Casualty Co. v. Hanson, supra, insured traveled about the U. S. looking for medical aid to treat his ailment.
Insured was also able to give some attention to his business correspondence. The court held that since insured could not do "all
the substantial acts necessary to be done" in prosecuting his business insured was "totally" disabled within the terms of the provision.
Two of the leading cases in Colorado construing a disability
clause interpret the clause of the Guardian Life Ins. Co., previously set forth. In the first case, Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. McMurry,5 insured was suffering from multiple sclerosis. The evidence showed he was fifty per cent efficient, that he could still
drive a car and do various odd jobs, and had done such jobs
although not for remuneration. Insured had operated a farm for
a corporation, of which he was a stockholder, that held and operated several farms. The court split into two parts the clause providing benefits to be paid if insured has "become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease so that he is and will
be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented thereby from
performing any work or from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit." The court said that the phrase
preceding the word "or" is conditioned on absolute helplessness.
Jennings v. Brotherhood Accident Co., 44 Colo. 70, 96 P. 982 (1908).
320 Colo. App. 393, 79 P. 176 (1905).
'The Mutual Benefit Association v. Nancarrow, 18 Colo. App. 274, 71 P.
423 (1903).
'105 Colo. 11, 94 P. 2d 1086 (1939).
2
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The phrase subsequent to the word "or" is to be determined by
what a reasonable man would believe to be a disability to follow
any occupation.
Construing what disables insured "from following any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit," the court said that
consideration must be given to whether insured had training or
education to fit him for any other type of employment. Insured
was disabled within the meaning of the policy if he was unable
to obtain work "he was fitted to do."
If insured was a lawyer, and because of illness unable to practice law but able to sell apples on a street corner, a strict construction of the disability clause would bar his recovery. In the McMurry case, there may be seen the first indication of a construction of the clause to mean a disability to perform the occupation
for which insured is trained and educated: "He had no training
to fit him for anything other than farming or some kind of mechanical work." As will be later demonstrated, the amount and
kind of work insured is able to do is an important factor in determining if insured is permanently and totally disabled.
PARTIAL ABILITY TO WORK

The leading and probably the most well-known case on disability insurance in Colorado is the case of Guardian Life Ins.
Co. v. Kortz.6 Kortz was a jeweler and suffered a heart and arthritic condition for which he claimed disability benefits. Conflicting evidence was introduced showing the length of time Kortz
was able to work in his store. As in the McMurry case, the court,
before considering if Kortz was disabled, considered the conditions
constituting disability. The court said that the words "so that
he is and will be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented
thereby from performing any work for profit" are not a limitation
on the preceding words, "totally and permanently disabled by
bodily injury or disease." Within such clauses disability occurs
if it wholly prevents one from performing any work or from
following any occupation for remuneration or profit.
Even though Kortz was able to do down to his store for a
few hours a day, he was sufficiently disabled to collect benefits of
the policy. The court said: "Since utter helplessness need not
be shown to bring plaintiff within terms of the policy, testimony
that he could not perform, all the duties of his former employment, was admissible to show a disability." (Italics supplied.)
The court goes on to say that the California case of Erreca
v. Western States Life Ins. Co. et al.,7 has "sound reasoning and
supports our conclusion."
Because of the significance which the Colorado court, in the
Kortz case, gives Erreca v. Ins. Co., and because Colorado has
' 109 Colo. 330, 125 P. 2d 640 (1942).
119 Calif. 2d 338, 121, P. 2d 689 (1942).
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probably adopted the "sound reasoning" expressed therein, extensive quotation therefrom seems justified. The case shows the significance of disability to perform the occupation for which insured
is trained and educated.
Insured was a farmer who directly supervised his farms. He
personally tested the soil, rode a horse over the land inspecting
it, worked with his farm hands in the fields, and carried on secretarial functions of making contracts, leases, etc. His accident
policy provided for benefits "whenever the insured becomes wholly
disabled by bodily injury or disease so that he is prevented thereby
from engaging in any occupation, or performing any work whatsoever for remuneration or profit." Insured was thrown from a
horse and severely injured. His legs were injured but after partial
recovery insured was able to drive a car to his fields and do secretarial farm work. He was unable to ride a horse, walk over his
fields inspecting them, or work with his men. The insnrance company claimed that because he could drive a car and carry on the
secretarial work of making leases and contracts that he was not
permanently and totally disabled within the meaning of the policy.
The court held otherwise:
The courts have held that total disability exists,
within the meaning of the term "any occupation" as contained in a general disability clause, whenever the insured is incapacitated from following any substantial or
remunerative occupation for which he is fitted or qualified, mentally or physically, and by which he is able to
earn a livelihood. The authorities supporting this rule
define total disability which prevents the insured from
engaging in any occupation or performing any work for
compensation, as a disability which prevents his working
with reasonable continuity in his customary occupation
or in any other occupation in which he might reasonably
be expected to engage in view of his station and physical
and mental capacity.
This construction of the words "any occupation" is
based upon the theory that it is unreasonable to deprive
an uneducated laborer, disabled from performing any
manual work, of the benefits of his policy, because he
might notwithstanding those disabilities, with training
and study, pursue a profession at some future date, or
become an accountant or banker. And it would be equally
unreasonable to hold that a doctor, lawyer, or business
executive is not totally disabled from engaging in "any
occupation" or performing "any work" because he is
able to run a news stand or work as a day laborer.
The disability clause explicitly conditions insurance
company's liability upon a total disability which prevents
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him "from engaging in any occupation, or performing
any work whatsoever for remuneration or profit." Nevertheless, and although respondent is a shrewd farm executive and a successful grain operator, the testimony discloses that he has had little formal education and is
neither trained nor qualified for any other occupation.
And because of his age and experience in life, he probably could not prepare himself for other remunerative
employment. Accordingly, the respondent must be deemed
to be totally disabled if he is no longer able to pursue the
occupation of farmer or farm supervisor.
*
recovery is not precluded under a total disability provision because the insured is able to perform
sporadic tasks, or give attention to simple or inconsequential details incident to the conduct of business.
It is interesting to note that in the Kortz case the disability
was brought about by disease, while in the Erreca case, which
the Colorado case seems to follow, the disability was brought
about by accident. It seems that, regardless of its cause, the elements constituting disability are the same.
So far we have only considered cases where the court held
that the disability incurred came within the total and permanent
clause. Denton v. Prudential Insurance Co. 8 is a case in which
the court found that the disability of the insured was not total
and permanent. In that case insured suffered a heart attack on
April 30th. He returned to work the following day but did not
feel well and only worked until May 3rd. He returned to work
on May 16th. He was weak and short of breath. On several occasions he had fainting spells. It was frequently necessary for
him to sit down and rest during his work. Following his illness
his employer took some of his territory away and some of his
associates helped him with minor parts of his work. Insured continued working with no decrease in compensation. He sued to
recover under the terms of his policy, alleging permanent and
total disability. The court held that the insured was not so disabled as to be able to claim benefits. "The rule is that the insured
may not be regarded as totally disabled as of a time when, although sick, diseased, injured or otherwise afflicted, he continues
to do his ordinary work or is regularly performing his usual and
customary duties." Although insured wasn't literally performing
his "usual and customary duties," since his employer took some
of his territory away and his colleagues helped him, the insured
was undoubtedly performing a substantial part of his duties. Unquestionably the court was also influenced by the fact that insured
continued to receive the same compensation during the time of
his alleged disability as he had received prior to his illness. It
' 100 Colo. 293, 67 P. 2d 77 (1937).
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will be made apparent that this compensation factor does affect
the problem of whether insured is considered disabled.
HousE CONFINEMENT
Before going into that problem, however, it might be well
to consider the house confinement clause that appears in some
policies. In the case of Jennings v. Brotherhood,9 the policy provided that: "A disability, to constitute a claim for indemnity for
sickness only, shall be continuous, complete and total, requiring,
As in the
. . ."
absolute, necessary confinement to the house
clause requiring total and permanent disability, the courts have
construed this house confinement clause liberally. If construed
strictly it would require that insured never, under any circumstances, leave his house. The courts have allowed recovery of
benefits where insured left his house to visit his physician or to
gain the benefit of the sunshine and fresh air.
OTHER INCOME

The purpose of disability insurance is to provide necessities,
not income. Most insurance companies only allow an amount of
insurance based on a percentage of his net income, usually fifty
percent. Doctors and dentists are not considered as good risks
and are usually only eligible for an amount up to one-third of
their net income. Some companies pro-rate the benefits they will
pay based on the amount insured receives from other health and
accident policies he holds. The problem arises as to whether insured may receive insurance benefit payments if he is disabled
but receives income from other sources, such as investments or
sick leave pay. Colorado seems to hold that such private income
makes no difference, if insured is in fact disabled. In Denton v.
Prudential Ins., supra, the insured still continued to receive his
full salary. In construing the policy the court considered this
salary factor and said that the compensation or profit received
must be remunerative and not merely nominally so. That if it is
remunerative insured is not totally and permanently disabled
within the meaning of the contract.
In Guardian Life v. Kortz, supra, the defendant insurance
company contended that because plaintiff, during the period for
which he claimed disability benefits, received wages or remuneration from his company (Sixty per cent of the stock was owned
by him. The remainder was owned by a brother-in-law whom
plaintiff had taken into the business and trained from boyhood.)
was proof that during such period insured was not disabled. The
court was unable to agree with the company's contention, saying:
944 Colo. 70, 96 P. 982 (1908). See also Mutual Benefit Assoc. v. Nancarrow,
18 Colo. App. 274, 71 P. 423 (1903) and Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc.
v. McDonald, 73 Colo. 308, 215 P. 135 (1923).
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Under some circumstances where employer and employee are strangers, such fact might be very strong evidence of no disability. It is pertinent to note that the
policy does not provide indemnity if plaintiff does not
receive a salary, but if he is disabled to the extent therein
specified. Receiving a salary from a stranger, who had
no personal or sentimental reason for paying him except for services that were of value, would be one thing;
that he was paid by a corporation owned principally by
himself and partly by his brother-in-law, who was under
obligations to him, is quite another.
And in Erreca v. Western States Life, supra, which the Kortz
case said used "sound reasoning and supports our conclusion,"
the court there said that the magnitude of insured's enterprise
and income therefrom have no proper place in the determination
of whether insured is totally disabled from performing remunerative work.
SURGERY

In certain types of injuries or sickness the disability can be
corrected by surgery. Is insured required to undergo surgery to
correct the disability? Under Colorado state decisions insured is
not required to undergo an operation if corrective surgery is not
made a condition precedent in the policy. If the operation is a
minor one, involving little risk, and was suggested as a normal
procedure by insured's own physician, it might be held that insured could not collect benefits. The leading Colorado case ohi
this subject is Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Matz. 10 The company there contended that, in aid of recovery, insured should be
required to submit to a surgical operation which, seemingly, he
had declined to undergo. The company offered to prove, by two
reputable physicians of its choosing, that insured was suffering
from osteomyelitis of the tibia, that the indicated method of
treatment was an operation. The company said that both doctors
would testify that the operation was recognized as the correct
treatment for osteomyelitis, that the operation was not inherently
dangerous to life or health, that the operation was not extremely
painful, and that an operation offered better than a ninety per
cent chance of complete recovery. The offer was rejected by the
trial court. The supreme court upheld the trial court saying that
insured "is under no contractual obligation to so submit and
thereby incur expense and risk his life so that insurer might be
relieved of its liability to him."
In Roderick v. Metropolitan Life,". cited in the Matz case,
the doctrine of estoppel is considered. There the insured was suf10102 Colo. 587, 81 P. 2d 775 (1938).
1125 Mo. App. 852, 98 S.W. 2d 983 (1936).
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fering from a bladder condition which insured's attending physician said rendered insured unable to work. The physician did
admit the possibility of a cure through a serious but not necessarily dangerous operation. The physician had not suggested
such operation to insured. The court held that the doctrine of
estoppel would not apply. Estoppel was said to be applicable
only when it is shown that the disability might be cured if insured
would be willing to comply with the course of treatment prescribed
for him by his own doctor. In this case, however, there was no
showing that the doctor or any other physician had ever suggested
to plaintiff that he should have an operation for his bladder trou*ble, so there was no proof of a refusal on his part and thus no
grounds to claim estoppel.
The federal case of Home Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,12 (reversing the Colorado case Stewart v. Home Life Ins.13 ), also deals
with the subject of surgery as a prerequisite to recovery of benefits. This case may be authority for arguing that in some instances possible correction of disability by surgery may disqualify
insured from benefits. In this case insured suffered a cataract
condition. The lens of both eyes were removed by surgery. Without the use of glasses the plaintiff had no useful sight in an
economic or industrial sense. With glasses he had normal vision
and became engaged in an occupation for compensation and profit.
The plaintiff underwent an operation and wore glasses by his
own volition. He sought recovery under a policy which read: "The
irrecoverable loss of sight in both eyes . . . . shall constitute
total and permanent disability within the meaning of this contract . . . ." The court held that because insured had recovered
his sight he couldn't recover benefits, saying that the coverage
was limited to loss of function and did not embrace the loss of
any part of the physical eye and that the loss must be irrecoverable.
DUTY TO CORRECT DISABILITY

This case can be distinguished from the preceding cases in
that the policy here stipulated "irrecoverable loss." Would insured be able to recover benefits if his policy stipulated "permanent and total disability," instead of "irrecoverable loss"? The
Matz case holds that insured, under such a clause, is under no
duty to undergo an operation to correct his disability. What if
insured voluntarily underwent surgery, as in the Home Life case?
It would seem unjust to deprive insured of benefits because he
had "commendable coverage" and voluntarily submitted to surgery
when it was not required. Yet, the Home Life case seems to hold
that insured would be disqualified from benefit payments if surgery
corrects his disability.
12114 F. Rep, 2d 516 10th Cir., (1940).
"129 F. Supp. 834, Dist. Colo. (1939).
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In the Home Life case what would be the decision if insured
had refused to undergo surgery? The course nicely sidesteps this
problem by saying, "we do not explore that question because with
commendable courage he voluntarily underwent two operations."
However, the court cites Southland Life v. Dunn 14 as being in
accord with its opinion. In the Southland case insured had refused
to undergo surgery for his cataract. The court there held that
because minor surgery, under little danger, could correct his disability he could not recover benefits even though he was physically
disabled, since this disability could be corrected with little difficulty. It would thus seem that in the Federal District Court for
Colorado, the Matz case has, to an extent, been nullified.
ARTIFICIAL CORRECTION

Closely akin to the problem of whether insured must undergo
surgery to, if possible, correct his disability, is the problem of
corrected disability by artificial means. When a man loses a hand
and has it replaced with an artificial hook can he still receive
benefits under his policy? Although there are few Colorado cases
on the subject, it would seem that he could continue to receive
benefit payments. Two out of the three cases on this subject concern themselves with the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is
recognized that such decisions are an interpretation of a statute
but it would seem that they can be used for arguing similar situations occurring under a disability clause of a health and accident
policy.
In Mark Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. 15 (cited in Great
American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., post), the plaintiff
sued for disability benefits under workmen's compensation. He
had suffered the loss of a hand but an artificial hand with which
he was able to continue working at the same job performing similar acts. The court there held that because he was able to some
extent perform the same work with the artificial hand was no
reason to deny him benefits. "It is enough that the normal use
...
. has been taken entirely away."
Would an eye disability corrected by glasses disqualify insured
from benefit payments? This question has not been directly answered by the Colorado courts. It has not been directly decided
because in one case the Federal court is dealing with a clause
stipulating "irrecoverable" loss of sight, Home Life Ins. v. Stewart,
supra. In the other case the Colorado supreme court is dealing
with the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Great American Indemnity
16
Co. v. Industrial Comm.
In comparison with artificial limbs, glasses are not an unusual part of a person's habiliment. In Home Life Ins. v. Stewart,
2471 S.W. 2d 1103.
15286 Ill. 620, 122 N.E. 84 (1919).
18114 Colo. 91, 162 P. 2d 413 (1945).
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the court pointed out that "glasses are worn by a substantial proportion of people of all ages. Many of them have very little vision
in the natural eye, but with the use of glasses their vision is substantially normal for all practical purposes. They pursue their
business and professions with success. They meet in competition
those with normal vision in the natural eye, and they are not
seriously handicapped.
In Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra,
the problem arose as to whether the effect of corrective lenses
should be considered in awarding compensation for impaired vision
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court held that the
effect of glasses in correcting vision should not be considered in
awarding the statutory allowance.
In the Great American case the court gives an analogy between a disability corrected by an artificial limb and corrected
by glasses. The Federal court in the Home Life case says that no
such analogy exists, that the loss of both feet or both legs and the
use of cork or wooden substitutes, on one hand, and the loss of sight
in both eyes resulting from a cataractous condition and its restoration through surgery and the use of glasses, on the other, cannot
be regarded as closely akin to respect to disability. In general
concept they are so widely apart that they do not bear any reasonable analogy. The difference is too plain to call for elaboration.
Whether insured, under a total and permanent disability
clause, could continue to receive benefits if his eye disability was
corrected by glasses, cannot be determined from these cases. If
Colorado is going to continue to hold that insured need not undergo
surgery to correct a disability, it can be argued that insured need
not wear glasses to correct his disability. But if insured voluntarily wears glasses, which correct the disability, may he continue
to receive benefits? If corrected disability by surgery may be
compared to correction by artificial means, then under Home Life
Ins. v. Stewart if insured wore glasses correcting his vision he
could not continue to receive benefits. On the other hand, in the
Great American case the Supreme Court of Colorado held that
it would not even consider the effect of glasses in relation to receipt of benefits under workmen's compensation. Would the court
consider glasses in regard to health and accident insurance? It
is possible that Colorado would follow its reasoning in the Great
American case and consider the Federal case of Home Life a
black sheep, both as to correcting disability by surgery and corrected disability by glasses.
An interesting case would be an attempt to collect disability
benefits for an injury. to an artificial limb. If insured had an artificial limb when he took out his policy and this limb were subsequently destroyed, could insured collect benefits for his disability
until another limb could be manufactured? It is doubtful if such
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recovery could be had. Colorado has no decisions on this point.
However, another Industrial Commission case, London Guarantee
and Accident Co. v. Industrial Comm, 7 would seem good authority
for supporting a conclusion of no recovery. The district court
gave judgment affirming an award of the Industrial Commission
for accidental injury to a wooden leg. In reversing the decision
the supreme court said:
Compensation can be awarded for personal injuries
only, which means injury to the person. A wooden leg
is a man's property, not part of his person, and no compensation can be awarded for its injury.
It is interesting to note the effect that the foregoing decisions
have had upon The Guardian Life clause. Compare the clause cited
at the beginning of this article with the clause that the Guardian
Life Insurance Company has used in its policies since 1950. It
has changed its clause to read:
Total disability is defined as incapacity of the insured, resulting from bodily injury or disease which prevents him from performing substantially all of the work
pertaining to his occupation or any other occupation for
which he is or may be suited by education, training or
experience. The entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight
of both eyes, or the use of both hands, or both feet or of
one hand and one foot, is considered to be total disability.
In the years to come another law student may have occasion
an article on this "new" clause and the court's construcwrite
to
tion of it.
INVITATION TO YELLOWSTONE MEETING
All Colorado lawyers and their families are invited to attend
the first regional meeting of the American Bar Association to be
held in this area. All facilities of Yellowstone National Park will
be surrendered to the legal profession on June 17 to 21, 1952, and
attorneys from Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming will participate.
In conjunction with this convention, there will be Institutes
on Oil and Gas, Taxation, Legal Draftsmanship and Trial Tactics
and there will be meetings of the Junior Bar Conference and Sections on Administrative Law, Labor Law, Judicial Administration,
Insurance Law and Mineral Law. On the lighter side, there will
be dancing and other entertainment every night, and sightseeing
tours and boat rides during the day to complete your family holiday.
For further literature, registration forms or other information, contact the Bar Association Secretary, Terry J. O'Neill, 1726
Champa Street, Denver.
" 80 Colo. 162, 249 P. 642 (1923).
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THE INSURER AS THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST
IRVING P. ANDREWS
of the Denver Bar

A client comes to your office the victim, let us say, of an automobile collision in which he has suffered personal injuries, loss
of wages, agonizing pain, and property damage. After relating
the details' surrounding the accident, the first question you'll
probably ask is whether or not the prospective defendant has
insurance. Assuming an affirmative answer is given to this inquiry, you proceed to advise your client that, notwithstanding the
existence of insurance, unless a favorable settlement can be obtained from the insurance carrier, the matter of recovery must
be presented to a court and determined by a jury wherein the question of insurance coverage cannot be affirmatively disclosed. A
quizzical look clouds your client's face, and he answers that unless
the fact of insurance is disclosed, any verdict he would receive
would not reflect that the insurance company is the real adversary,
to the exclusion of the thoughtless defendant who "ran" the inevitable red light. Thus begins the hopeless and ungratifying
effort to explain to your client the "hide and go seek" method
that presently prevails throughout the majority of the jurisdictions in the trial of negligence cases where the question of insurance coverage beclouds the problem.
The present status of the law permits parties litigant to exalt
form over substance. On voir dire examination it is permissible
to ask questions as to whether or not the prospective juror is a
director, stockholder, employee, or is in any manner interested

in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against
liability for damages for injuries to persons or property. Or a
more specific question may be asked in which a particular insurance company is named. Both questions as to form have been
approved as proper on voir dire examination.' The Supreme Court
of Colorado has approved the use of the specific question 2 and
has not limited the scope of inquiry as to the matter of insurance
3
in the form of questions on voir dire examination. Thus in the
case of John's v. Shinall 4 the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
It is permissible to interrogate prospective jurors,
some of whom may be selected to serve in the case, as to
their connection with or interest in insurance companies,
and we have held that questions touching this matter may
be asked of every prospective juror.
156 A.L.R. 1456 and 104 A.L.R. 1067.
'Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 498 (1906).
2Ibid.
I John's v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 86 P. 2d 605 (1939).
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It is permissible, and rightly so, that each of twelve
prospective jurors in a case be asked on voir dire examination whether he is a stockholder, agent, or employee
of an insurance company.
Here under the prevailing rules of procedure and controlling
decisions, the "insurance question" is introduced into the trial
by sly innuendo and indirection. With modern society, insurance
has become a necessity to the home owner and automobile driver.
The fact of insurance is notorious, not only to lawyers and judges,
but to juries as well. Whether by specifically naming a particular
insurance company or by general inquiry as to insurance, the
jury is made aware that, notwithstanding the machinations of
both court and counsel, some insurance company has a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation. Insurance companies
generally, desire to avoid prosecuting actions in their own names
we are told, because of the prejudicial effect disclosure of their
identity and interest has upon the jury. It is a common and
ordinary occurrence in the typical indemnity suit to find that
both parties are insured, that the insurance carrier has provided
both parties with counsel, and that the action is being conducted
by the insurers. The realities of the controversy are thus hidden
from the jury. The casualty company that is really defending
or prosecuting the suit is immune from such disclosure and mention of the fact results in mistrial. In Butera v. Donner 5 a New
York court said:
"It is highly incongruous to observe the courts upon
one hand guarding with direst of sanctions against the
injection into a casualty case of the fact, even the suggestion, of liability insurance covering the defendant, and
on the other hand welcoming with warm hospitality the
injection into a casualty case of the fact of collision insurance covering the plaintiff. In both instances, the
insurer is the real party in interest; it selects and retains
counsel, controls the case and profits or loses by the outcome."
The New York court, cited supra, stated without unnecessary
quibbling what every intelligent juror can be presumed to know.
Disclosure of the fact of insurance is believed to arouse prejudice
and consequently result in a denial of a fair and impartial trial.
Under the guise of questioning propounded for the purpose of
determining the bias, interest, or prejudice of a juror, the insurance question is insinuated into the trial and left dangling at the
conclusion of the voir dire without further mention unless counsel
for both sides inform the jurors that these questions are being
asked to determine their fitness to serve as jurors in the trial.
If the insurance question is belabored by detailed explanation,
I Butera v. Donner, 177 Misc. 966, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (1942).
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the basic reason and purpose for its exclusion is circumvented,
and the question of insurance is squarely brought before the jury.
By now your client complains that all this legalistic hairsplitting is utterly incomprehensible. He informs you that all
you have said thus far is that you can and you cannot inform
the jury that the defendant does or does not have insurance. To
pacify him you'll probably explain to him that there have been
numerous proposals to remedy the situation. The first alternative
being to exclude all references to insurance either by a general
or specific inquiry, or as a second alternative a full disclosure
should be made of the insurance carriers interest, or as a third
alternative he or any injured party should by statute be authorized to bring the action directly against the insurance carrier
without being forced first to obtain a judgment against the insured, which is the prevailing policy in some jurisdictions that
are attempting to restore order in this area of the law where
opinions run hot and fast. One illustration of the trend to relieve
the injured party of the burden of maintaining an imaginary law
suit is found in Chapter 155, General Laws of Rhode Island, Section 258, which provides as follows:
Every policy hereafter written insuring against liability for property damage or personal injuries or both,
and every policy hereinafter written indemnifying any
person by reason of such liability, other than payment of
compensation under Chapter 300, shall contain provisions
to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the
injured -party and, in the event of his death, to the party
entitled to sue therefor, to pay him the amount of damages for which such insured is liable. Such insured party,
or, in the event of his death the party entitled to sue
therefor, in his suit against the insured, shall not join
the insurer as defendant. If however, the officer serving
any process against the insured shall return said process
"non est inventus," the said injured party and in the
event of his death, the party entitled to sue therefor, may
proceed directly against the insurer. Said injured party,
or, in the event of his death the party entitled to sue
therefor after having obtained judgment against the insured alone, may proceed on said judgment in a separate
action against the insurer: Provided, however, that the
payment in whole or in part of such liability by either
the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent thereof,
be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so
paid.
All policies described in this section shall be deemed
to be made subject to the provisions hereof, and all provisions of such policies inconsistant herewith shall be
void.
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Decisions construing the statute set out above indicate that
the legislative policy is to give neither side of the controversy
an unfair advantage and to provide for direct action against the
insurance carrier only when certain conditions precedent occur.
In Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America,6 the Rhode Island court said:
The insurer cannot be joined in any action against
the insured, and only when the insured cannot be served
with process may this action be brought directly against
the insurer. The insurer's liability is in the nature of a
surety whose obligation is limited to the contractual obligation under the insurance policy.
To further safeguard the insurer in an action brought directly
against it, the plaintiff must establish his case exactly as though
the insured was the defendant, and every defense available to
7
the insured is available to the insurer.
While the Rhode Island statute requires the "non est" return
as a prior condition to bringing a direct action against the insurance carrier, direct action is allowed.
Judicial decisions and present rules of procedure, you explain
to your client, mark a great advance over the common law and
the code yet much remains to be desired. Finally, as your client
succumbs to the tedium of your remarks, you inform him that
the real party in interest in any negligence and casualty case
remains the hidden foe beyond the pale of the real party in interest
statutes, and with a final rhetorical flourish you ask him, is legislation the answer?

THE SELLER OF ONE MINK COAT v.
PVT. JOHNNIE DOE
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
of the Denver Bar, Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of La6v

Judgment for whom in the above designated action? '35 C.S.A.
Ch. 83 Sec. 10 provides as follows:
The expenses of the family and the education of the
children are chargeable upon the property of both husband
and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately.
The language in the decisions under the statute seems to
leave no doubt that Johnnie would be liable for the purchase as a
"family expense" if his wife bought and wore the coat herself
during a time when they were living together.' But the Supreme
6Luft v. Factory Mut. Liability Insurance Co., 51 R.I. 452, 155 A. 797.
'Ibid.
IGilman v. Mathews, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 P. 366; Houck v. La Junta Hardware Co., 50 Colo. 228, 114 P. 645; Straight v. McKay, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60
P. 1106.
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Court has held the statute doesn't apply when the spouses are
"living apart" because, then, there is no "family," and the hus-2
band's liability is dependent on the article's being a necessary.
We shall assume that, on a private's pay, a mink coat is not.
If, then, the purchase is made while Johnnie and his wife are
happily married, but he is stationed away from her and his Colorado home, are the spouses still "living together" in the sense
required for application of the statute?
Let us first determine how our court has defined the term
"family."
Gilman v. Mathews, supra, concerned an action brought
against a husband and wife for clothing sold to the husband. A
judgment against the wife was reversed because there had been
no allegation or evidence that "any family relation existed between the defendants; nothing to show that there was any family,
or that defendants were living together" at the time the purchase
was made. The admission that the defendants were husband and
wife was not enough to bring the debt within the provisions of
the statute. In defining the term "family," the court said:
A family is defined to be a collective body of persons
who live in one house and under one management.
Substantially the same definition was later applied in a decision concerning goods sold to a husband and wife, some of which
were used by their servants. 3 The court held that servants, living
in the household, were included in the term "family."
In Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, supra, the court, in holding the statute did not apply because the spouses were living
apart (either by mutual consent or because of the fault of the
wife)' at the time of the purchases, spoke as follows: "As the
Jesters were not living together as a family in fact, at the time
the goods were sold, it is conceded that the statute . . . relative
to family expenses has no application." (Italics mine.) And in
O'Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., supra, the court pointed out
that the wife and children were "living separate and apart, and in
a different house, from the defendant" at the time of the purchase and therefore the statute had no application. In the latter
case, the reason for the separation was not disclosed.
In none of the Colorado cases, however, do we find a disclosure that the husband and wife were living apart "involuntarily," or simply because, though "friendly" they preferred separate home or found them expedient for other reasons. Let us,
then, look at the language of the courts construing family expense statutes which have been held to apply under these circumstances.
'Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, 60 Colo. 290, 152 P. 903; O'Brien v.
Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., 65 Colo. 70, 173 P. 544; Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo.
509, 216 P. 259; See also: Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P. 2d 953.
. Perkins v. Morgan, 36 Colo. 360, 85 P. 640.
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Two Washington cases are of interest. The first 4 concerns the
liability of a wife for the medical and hospital expenses of her
husband who was working in Washington while the wife was in
Pennsylvania. The court applied the statute because "it does not
follow from that fact alone that the family relationship had in a
legal sense been severed." Further, the court said,
It is not necessary that the husband and wife shall
at all times reside under the same roof, in order that
the legal status of the family may be preserved. It is a
matter of common knowledge that many husbands in their
struggles for a livelihood are often required to be far from
home and for long periods of time and that such enforced
absences are in behalf of the family, in order that the
comforts of life may be provided for them .... It will not
do to say that in such cases the family status is destroyed
by somewhat continued absense of the husband.
In the above case, the wife had indulged in certain acts of
tenderness toward the husband during his illness and had paid
a portion of the hospital bill before his death. After deciding
that the wife was liable under the statute, the court cited Gilman
v. Mathews, supra, and stated that the Colorado court's views
"may not be altogether in harmony with what we have hereinbefore said concerning the nature of the facts which may be sufficient to establish the legal existence of the family relation."
In the second case, 5 the parties were living separately because
of the wife's confinement in a mental institution. There, the court
said, . . . both spouses, if living in the marriage relation, constitute a family." (Italics mine.) Further, ". . . it is not always
necessary, in law, that, in order to constitute a family, the members thereof reside together under one roof," a statement obviously
contrary to that of our court in Gilman v. Mathews, supra. The
case held the statute applies "provided the marital relationship
has not been severed and there has been no intentional separation." (Italics mine.)
In a late Washington case, 6 the court held the husband not
liable for the board bill of his deceased wife incurred after their
separation by mutual consent and before she had instituted divorce proceedings. Though the case is not strictly in point on
our issue, the following language of the court is of interest:
In order to interpret the statute in question which
deals specifically with the family relationship, we must
distinguish a marital relationship from a family relationship . . . . There is a marriage without a family
where the spouse or either of them fail and refuse to discharge all of their reciprocal obligations and live separate
Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 664, 82 P. 998.
In re De Nisson's Guardianship, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P. 2d 1024.
'Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wash. 2d 977, 168 P. 2d 404.
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and apart from each other. Where a spouse by words or
conduct, evidences an intention not to maintain the marriage state in its family aspects and disavows all marital
obligations, the other is freed from the liabilities incident to the marital status which are based upon the reciprocal aspects of the relationship. (Italics mine.)
It is worthy of note that the Washington court has apparently not held the husband liable for the necessaries of the wife
when the spouses were living apart through mutual consent or
the fault of the husband as our court held in Bauer v. Abrahams,
supra, and, therefore that court's interpretation of the statute
might well tend to be broader than ours.
A Utah case 7 includes dictum that the statute should apply
when the husband and wife are "merely temporarily living apart
and where the family relation has not in fact been severed."
Two Illinois cases are also in point. In the first,8 the husband
had spent substantially all of the nine months period in which
the goods were charged away from the wife, but he visited her
a half dozen or so times during the separation and during the
visits he was "treated as one of the family." The court said, "We
are unable, from this evidence, to find that there was any such
separation as the law recognizes." In the second, 9 the court said,
"In view of . . . the fact that defendant and his wife, though
having separate homes, lived together as husband and wife and
were, therefore, a family, we are satisfied that the coat was a
family expense for which the defendant is liable."
The above cases are certainly authority for the proposition
that a separation caused entirely by military duty is not the type
of "separation" which prevents the application of the family expense statute to a debt incurred by the wife. But, if representing
the plaintiff in our hypothetical action, I could not feel too confident of success in view of our court's reiterated definition of a
"family", nor in view of its quotation with approval from Schlessinger v. Keith, 30 Ill. App. 253,10 which said, "appellants" (sellers
of the goods to the wife) "had no notice of such separation.
Neither had the husband any notice that the wife was buying
goods." (Italics mine.)
Perhaps the real answer lies in determining the reason for
the requirement that the family must be "living together" in order
for the statute to apply. Is it because when the husband and
wife are living apart in a manner in which their mutual obligations are not being discharged, their mutual liability should also
fall, as indicated by the Washington cases? Or is it because only
when the husband and wife are together does each have any deBerow v. Shields, 48 Utah 270, 159 P. 538.
'Hudson v. King Brothers, 23 IMl. App. 118.
'Louis Berman and Co., Inc. v. Dahlberg, 336 Ill. App. 233, 83 N. E. 2d 380.
1oGilman v. Mathews, supra.
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gree of control over the other's expenditures, as indicated by the
Illinois case?
Maybe, one day, Pvt. Johnnie Doe will have his answer.

FOURTH ANNUAL LAW INSTITUTE
The Fourth Annual Law Institute, jointly sponsored by the
Junior Bar Sections of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and the College of Law of the University of Denver will be in
progress beginning April 14 and ending May 5. The Institute will
be held in Room 314, Business Administration Building of the
University of Denver, 1445 Cleveland Place.
The subject of the Institute this year is Estate Planning. The
subject will be treated in a series of seven late afternoon sessions,
from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. each Monday and Wednesday, featuring
instruction by members of the profession well qualified by their
research and experience in estate management.
Cooperating with the Junior Bar in the undertaking is the
Rocky Mountain Chapter of the American Society of Chartered
Life Underwriters who are providing instruction on the place of
life insurance in planning an estate, the underwriting of plans
for liquidating a decedent's interest in a business venture, veteran
and social security retirement plans, and related subjects.
The detailed program, a copy of which has been mailed separately to all members of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations,
is planned to outline the factors which must be considered by
attorneys in order best to serve the interests of their clients. It is
hoped that the Institute will be of especial benefit to the younger
members of the bar.

BOOK TRADERS CORNER
William M. Swift offers for sale a sizeable library of law books,
all in good condition, in which is included volumes 1 through 27
of the Colorado Appeals, volumes 1 through 96 of the Colorado
Reports, volumes 1 through 105 of the Iowa Reports and volumes
1 through 104 of the Northeastern Reporter series.
For further information concerning this library you are invited to contact Mr. Swift at 2118 North Tejon Street, Colorado
Springs, Colorado.
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PEOPLE, EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. NEWER,
...... Colo ........ (March 24, 1952).
The defendant, a real estate broker in Denver, in December,
1951, prepared a will 1 for an elderly couple, charged them $10.00
and gave them a receipt which read "for drawing legal document." In February, 1952, the matter came to the attention of
the Committee on Unauthorized Practices of the Denver Bar
Association which referred it to the Attorney General with its
recommendation that the defendant be prosecuted for contempt
of the Supreme Court.
An original proceeding in contempt was initiated promptly
and a citation issued. The defendant appeared by his attorneys
and filed an answer alleging that the $10.00 which he received
was a gift and not a fee; that he had acted only as a scrivener
in the transaction and that this was the only instance in which
he had ever so acted..
On March 24, 1952, the Court found the defendant guilty of
the unauthorized practice of law and assessed a fine against him
in the amount of $100.00, or 30 days in the Denver County jail.
This case is of tremendous significance to every member of
the Bar. It is the first time in the history of the Colorado Supreme
Court that it has punished a layman for contempt of court for
unauthorized practice under circumstances in which (1) the layman did not 2 represent himself to be an attorney at law, and
(2) the unauthorized practice (so far as revealed by the evidence)
consisted of an isolated transaction. These precedent-making conclusions of the Court are so important that they are worthy of
comment.
Vol. 2 C.S.A., Ch. 14, Sec. 21, makes it a contempt of the
Colorado Supreme Court for any person who does not have a
license so to do "to advertise, represent or hold himself out in
any manner as an attorney, attorney at law, or counselor at
law . . . .." The unsettled question under this statute has always
been this: Does a layman who does not call himself an attorney,
attorney at law, or counseler at law, but who undertakes to render
services of a legal nature, violate the statute? This question was
discussed in Dicta, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, December, 1947. An affirmative answer may be read into the language of the statute in
the words "in any manner as an attorney . . . ." by arguing that
when a person holds himself out as being competent to render
legal services he necessarily, although by implication and not
expressly, holds himself out to be a lawyer. The order in the
instant case does not make it clear whether such an interpretation
of the Statute is the basis of the Court's ruling. On the other
I The will, on a printed form, was a joint will and a classic example of the
dangers of this sort of activity by laymen.
2Newspaper stories to the contrary notwithstanding.
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hand, if the statute be given the more restrictive meaning to the
effect that the holding out must be an express representation that
the person is an attorney at law, etc., there is still ample basis
for the Court's ruling in the instant case by virtue of its inherent
authority to punish for contempt irrespective of the Statute. However, as to whether the Colorado Supreme Court would do this
or not has also been an unsettled question. Such authority has
been hinted at in earlier Colorado cases, but has never been invoked by the Court.3 There is overwhelming authority from other
jurisdictions for such a position. 4 The rationale of these decisions
is that the court has inherent authority to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, in the public interest, as a necessary corrolary to its authority to govern admissions to the bar. In any
event, it must be clear that the Court in the instant case followed
one, or perhaps both, of the above theories. Since this is the first
time that it has done so, the arsenal of remedies for the punishment of unauthorized practices has been greatly expanded.
The second factor which makes this case so important is that
the transaction involved was an isolated occurrence. In earlier
cases the Court has indicated that the practice complained of
must constitute a course of conduct or a series of acts before it
would punish for contempt., It has always been difficult for the
writer to believe that the Court really meant what it seemed to
say in those cases. In reason it would seem that if an act be prohibited by law, it shouldn't be necessary to wait for a repetition.
The commission of a crime does not ordinarily depend for its
successful prosecution upon proof of a continuing series of crimes.
Further, as a practical matter, such a rule hamstrings the Bar
Committees on Unauthorized Practice because they never hear
of more than one such violation at a time. Such a rule, in addition,
does not properly consider the interest of members of the public
who, individually, can be harmed by isolated acts. They are never
harmed as a group. It should also be noted that the ruling in
the instant case is in harmony with the recent case of In re Baker,
supra, which is the subject matter of a note in the recent American Bar Association Journal.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the Court, although directing
'See People v. Wicks, 101 Colo. 397, 74 Pac. (2d) 665; People v. Jersin,
101 Colo. 406, 74 Pac. (2d) 668; People v. Flanders, 121 Colo. 25, 212 Pac. (2d)
502, where, however, the Court indicates in its statement of facts that Flanders
had expressly represented himself to be a lawyer.
4See
People ex rel. The Illinois State Bar Association v. Peoples Stock
Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901; State ex rel. Boynton v. Perkins, 13'8
Kan. 899, 28 Pac. (2d) 765; In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194
N.E. 313; State ex rel. Wright, Attorney-General v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268
N.W. 95; In re Baker, 85 Atl. (2d) 505, (N. J., December, 1951).
See People v. Denver Clearing House Banks, 99 Colo. 50, 59 Pac. (2d)
1182; where the Court Stated, "We think the drawing of wills, as a practice,
is the practicing of law . . ."; People ex rel. Attorney-General v. Jersin, supra.
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the publication of its order in the Colorado Reports, has not written a clarifying opinion. Regardless of the rationale of the decision, however, it is a landmark in the development of the law of
unauthorized practice in Colorado and should be recognized as
such. It demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Court, in
a clear case, to handle these problems with efficiency and dispatch.
Every lawyer in Colorado who recognizes his duty to the public
to protect it from the evils of spurious legal advice and his corrolary duty to protect himself and his profession from the constantly increasing encroachments of those who would practice
law without a license, may take heart from this decision.
WM. RANN NEWCOMB, Chairman,
Unauthorized Practiceof Law Committee,
The Denver Bar Association.

CASE COMMENTS
MIGRATORY DIVORCE -THE
GHOST OF MRS. HADDOCK GETS A SCARE (COOK v. COOK) '-Discovering that Mrs.
Cook was yet married to a Mr. Mann, Mr. Cook sent her to Florida
to clear the whole thing up. Coming back with a Florida divorce,
and, no doubt, a lovely tan, Miss Migratory and her lad tried the
marriage vow again. Unfortunately, the new Mrs. Cook was not at
peace in her heart, so off she went to Hawaii where she just happened to pick up a decree of separation and maintenance. Mr. Cook,
on the other hand, wasn't going to take it lying down. Why should
he when the Supreme Court of Vermont, with Mrs. Cook appearing,
would annul both of their marriages. It looked like Mr. Cook finally
cooked Mrs. Cook's goose. But, alas, Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter have their differences, you know, and
Mr. Justice Douglas was not about to let the ghost of Haddock v.
Haddock 2 enjoy squatters' rights into perpetuity. That is, not
without a good old Olson and Johnson scare in parting.
One would suppose that the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Douglas would not place a stumbling block in the path of the
victorious Williams v. North Carolina3 the Second, even if Mr.
Justice Frankfurter did dig up a ghost there. He could have emphasized so many things such as estoppel, condonation and collusion; such as collateral attack, void and voidable; such as domicile and presumptions in favor of competency of the members of
Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct. 157.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906). For some comments see Beale,
"Haddock Revisited," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1926); Vreeland, "Mr. and Mrs.
Haddock," 20 A. B. A. J. 568 (1934).
IWilliams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
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the Supreme Court of Vermont. Yes, this latter most particularly
since he was more than gracious in according such presumption
to the Florida Court. And Mr. Justice Frankfurter? Well, just
4
the First, and in
as was the case in Williams v. North Carolina,
Sherrer v. Sherrer 5 and Coe v. Coe,6 the gentleman went back to
dissenting.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 7 has
perhaps received its greatest interpretation when applied to the
recognition of divorce judgments. Since our law considers the
termination of marital status as a matter of state concern, it
readily followed that the laws of the state of the domicile would
control from a social science point of view. Ditson v. Ditson 1 may
be taken as an early (1856) example of this legal position. In
Atherton v. Atherton 9 (1901) the United States Supreme Court
compelled the New York court to recognize a Kentucky divorce
stating that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit
"because the husband always had his domicile in Kentucky and the
matrimonial domicile of the parties was in Kentucky." But five
years later the recalcitrant New York court again caused the
Supreme Court to consider the problem. In Haddock v. Haddock 10
the court sustained New York's refusal to recognize a Connecticut
divorce since the wife had not appeared in response to publication
(it being questionable who the court considered deserted whom).
The court said that it must always be borne in mind that where
full faith and credit is involved, the question of jurisdiction of the
court rendering the decree is always open to attack by a party
who was not personally served or did not enter an appearance.1'
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented, denying any distinction as to the
Atherton case and recalling that the Haddock case was parallel
in the fact situation to the Ditson case upon which the court relied
in Atherton v. Atherton. Then in the first Williams case, 12 the
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Douglas "expressly overruled
the Haddock case." Apparently the decision meant that a decree
granted ex parte by a court which finds petitioning spouse to be a
domiciliary without regard to length of sojourn is entitled to full
faith and credit so far as it determined the marital status. In the
second Williams case 13 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented
in the first case, wrote the majority opinion which seemed to restore Haddock v. Haddock. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented to the
recognition of prima facie evidence of domicile while at the same
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
1 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
'Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
Art. IV, Section 1.
I Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87.
9Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
"Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
" Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 settled the general issue in 1874.
"Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
" Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
4
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time holding that the fact of domicile as a jurisdictional factor
may be determined de novo by the court in a questioning state.
Sherrer v. Sherrer,14 Coe v. Coe 15 and Johnson v. Muelberger 16
shed more light on the problem and limited the chances for denying
full faith and credit by barring a spouse from later questioning
jurisdiction if (1) the issue of domicile had been contested by the
spouse on appearance at the trial, or (2) if the spouse appeared
and admitted the other's domicile, or (3) if the spouse had been
personally served in the divorce state.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Vermont 17 came two
years after the Sherrer and Coe decisions. The Vermont Court
had chosen to disregard theories of estoppel, collusion and fraud
on the court. This it had a right to do even according to the dissent in this case. The court, in annulling both marriages, certainly must have determined that none of the three situations mentioned above were present here for it permitted Mr. Cook to collaterally attack the judgment as to Mrs. Mann's domicile. This,
of course, was Mr. Justice Jackson's position in the dissent. Mr.
Justice Douglas, however, felt that the Vermont record did not
clearly show that the first husband had not appeared, and thus
that the first husband was yet in a position to contest jurisdiction.
The court stated, 18 "For until Florida's jurisdiction is shown to
be vulnerable, Vermont may not relitigate the issue of domicile
on which the Florida decree rests". Thus, the language of the
second Williams case was flaunted in the face of its writer. With
this the court remanded the cause to Vermont for proceedings
not inconsistent with its opinion.
Dedication to a cause is the highest of judicial attributes.
But one sometimes wonders whether this characteristic is being
sacrificed rather than nurtured in the give and take of judicial
pugilistics. In any event the attorney now must ascertain that
the court is clearly setting forth the facts showing lack of jurisdiction in the divorce state which will justify its refusal to recognize the divorce collaterally attacked. This is so despite the fact
that such a refusal could be based on no other findings than that
those considerations are present. Perhaps placing the responsibility on the attorney is as it should be. Realizing the failure of
federal legislation to determine the manner in which full faith
and credit is to be realized, Mr. Justice Robert Jackson earlier
"Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
"Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
"Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951).
"Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A- 2d 593.
"Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct. 157, 160 (1951) The court felt entitled to assume
a limited view because of the burden placed upon one assailing the decree
of a sister state by Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 at page
234, and also by Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Esenwein,
325 U. S. 279, 280-281 (1945). The court further stated that it dealt only with
the presumption not with the issues on which the Vermont court made its
findings. Cook v. Cook, supra, at page 160.

April, 1952

DICTA

has registered such a charge to the legal profession. 19 In fact
he considers the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as "peculiarly the
20
attorneys' clause".
GEORGE F. BARBARY.

DIVORCE FORMS CORRECTED
It has been called to the attention of the subcommittee on
District Court Forms, that the acceptance of service to be used
in divorce litigation shown at page 95 of Volume XXIX, Number 3,
Dicta (March, 1952), is incorrect in that it does not comply with
Rule 4 (i) 5, of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
"Proof of service of process shall be made as follows: . . . . by the admission or waiver of service by
the person to be served, duly acknowledged."
In view of this error, waiver of service to be used in divorce
litigation should read as follows:
"STATE OF COLORADO,
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERfSS"
I, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, being duly sworn, state that
I am of full age, am the defendant in this action, have received
a copy of the summons and complaint and accept service thereof,
and state that I am not now in the Military Service.
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn.
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me this 15th
day of February, 1952.
Sally N. Doakes,
Notary Public.
My commission expires September 20, 1953."
Royal C. Rubright chairman,
Forms Standardization Committee.
Donald M. Lesher, Chairman
Subcommittee on District Court Forms.
"Robert H. Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit," 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 33.
0While
the 1948 Judiciary Code (28 U. S. C. 1738) adds some certainty to
the situation, it probably does not relieve the attorney of the burden referred
to by Justice Jackson.
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SPECIAL OIL AND GAS ISSUE
The increased activity of the oil and gas industry in this area
is posing many new problems for Colorado lawyers. The work of
the industry in this state may still be classified as exploratory. As
exploration continues and development becomes more widespread
through better marketing facilities, legal problems are expected
to multiply greatly. Familiarity with this field of law is increasingly important to lawyers and, to meet this need, the Weld County
Bar Association recently sponsored an Institute on Oil and Gas.
Because of the excellence and popularity of this Institute and a
general demand for more information on the subject, the speakers
were asked to prepare their remarks for publication. The product
is here printed in the following five articles.-EDITOR.

OIL GEOLOGY AND THE DENVER BASIN
M. J. BOREING*

It is doubtful if a Geologist has ever been asked to preach
a sermon, but if so, his Scripture reference certainly would have
been Genesis 1:1, "In the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth." About one billion years later the geologist came along
and began explaining this first week's work; it was probably a
pretty full week, and the Creator doubtless got in some overtime.
In any event, the earth was created as a round mass of basic
material surrounded by a gaseous envelope which we call the
atmosphere. Without the atmosphere it might have remained a
barren ball, but the atmosphere furnished changes of climaterain, snow, ice, and wind-all great erosion agents; it made possible the glaciers, rivers, lakes, and oceans, including a warm
body of water, somewhere, where a spark of life first appeared.
Basic rocks were being cut down by erosion and were being deposited in seas and lakes in the form of shales and sandstones,
while plants and animals were living and dying, leaving their
remains as organic material in the deposits-in the form of coal,
oil, and gas. When the conditions on earth were such as to allow
the lush development of plant life, similar to our present jungles,
the dead plants formed a mass of material, which later was subjected to pressure, heat, and plenty of time, to become our present coal beds.
Elsewhere on earth, plants and animals, mostly microscopic,
were living and dying in the shallower portions of the oceans.
Their number was greater by trillions than Washington can conceive. As they died and sank to the ocean bottom, each carried
with it a minute particle of fatty material . . . and at the same
time, sands and shales from the rivers and shores were settling
* Partner in Dunn & Boreing, Consulting Geologists, Denver.
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on the ocean bottom, too. Larger animals, which had developed
protective shells, were dying and their remains likewise formed
deposits of animal matter and limey material on the sea floor.
So came the sedimentary oil bearing rocks of this earth-sandstones and shales from the basic rock, and limestones and carbinaceous materials from the once living plants and animals. As
erosional conditions on the surface of the earth varied, successions
of deposits were laid down-first a series of sandstones, then
shales, perhaps then a limestone, and so forth-all the while the
sea plants and animals were making a great effort to live, produce, and die. Their contribution to the oil business was the
tiny bit of fatty stuff they carried to their ocean graves. More
sediments poured in, pressure mounted, time passed, and Mother
Earth furnished sufficient heat for a slow "simmer". The fatty
stuff became a complex hydrocarbon which we call petroleum,
which is made up of a combination of carbon and hydrogen-the
lower the percentage of carbon, the lighter, or, higher gravity,
the petroleum. The simplest form is CH 4 or pure natural gas.
When petroleum contains considerably more carbon than hydrogen,
the Highway Department mixes it with sand and dirt, and builds
black-top roads.
POROSITY AND PERMEABILITY

The sandstones, shales, limestones, and petroliferous materials
deposited in the seas are called "source" beds. All these are stationery except the fluids-oil, gas, and water. These fluids occupy
the voids in the rocks, and ratio of the void spaces to the solid
mass of the rock is the "porosity" of the formation. In a sandstone the porosity is formed in the space between the sand grains
or in fractures; in a limestone the porosity may be formed in
voids between crystals, by voids in, and adjoining, fossils, or in
tiny Carlsbad Caverns. Porosity in shale is rare, and usually
occurs only after there has been a crushing and fracturing of
the formation. In order for there to be a commercial accumulation of oil and gas, these fluids in the rocks must become segregated, and nature has solved this problem, simply by giving oil
and gas the good old Ivory Soap treatment, whereby "It Floats."
However, there can be no movement of fluids through a formation unless there is a connection, or channel, from one bit of
porosity to the next. This quality of a rock to allow the flowage
of fluids is called its "permeability". There cannot be a good oil
field, regardless of the thickness of the reservoir, the porosity, or
the amount of oil saturation, unless the reservoir rock has permeability. An example of this is the Clark's Lake Pool over northwest of Denver. Amerada found almost 100 feet of saturated
sand with good porosity, but was able to complete only small wells
because the permeability of the sand was very low. Similar conditions exist at Buckingham, east of Greeley.
Now, we will assume we have a sandstone formation, deeply
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buried, which is underlaid and overlaid by impervious beds, and
which is completely saturated with a mixture of water, oil, and
gas. This sandstone has good porosity and permeability. If the
bed is absolutely horizontal, the oil and gas will form a scum
on top of the water, but if the bed dips in any direction, then
the oil and gas will slowly, very slowly, start the uphill journey
to reach the top of the water column, and if these conditions
remain constant, eventually the sandstone will outcrop, and the
oil and gas will be dissipated into the air. However, when conditions do not remain constant, an oil pool might be formed. Thus
it becomes apparent why geologists seek the abnormal rather than
the normal conditions. If the sandstone does not outcrop, the
oil and gas will continue the journey to a point beyond which
movement is impossible and that point would be the place to
stake out a homestead.
Following is a list of typical oil traps. Illustrations of these
may be found in any book on Petroleum Geology:
1. Dome, or anticline (Rangely).
2. Pinchout (East Texas).
3. Unconformity (Many pools).
4. Change of porosity or permeability (Many fields).
5. Faulting (Many pools).
6. Salt plugs (Gulf Coast).
7. Reefs (Canyon Reef in Scurry County, Texas).
8. Fractured Shale (Florence, Colorado).
Many of the large oil pools have been discovered by surface
geology. This type of geology is only possible in areas where
there are persistent rock beds out-cropping on the surface. Levels
are run on the surface beds, and if there is an indication of an
anticline, or a dome, on the surface, these structural conditions
may extend downward, and may form an oil trap. Of course, a
huge structure, as that at Rangely, Colorado, is very evident on
the surface. There the outcropping rocks form escarpments many
feet high, which encircle the field, dipping away from the center
at all points.
In the vast areas in which it is impossible to do surface
geology, other means of exploration must be tried-the most successful of which is with a measuring device called the seismograph.
Unfortunately this device acts exactly the same over oil as it
does over salt water, as far as its own actions are concerned.
However, it is a great implement for finding deep-seated structures in the earth's crust. Many of the aforementioned oil traps
may be indicated by a seismic survey.
There is a particular group of geologists continually looking
for oil, but they, like the attorneys, wear their Sunday suits all
week. They represent the "Sub-Surface Department", and they
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find a lot of oil. Any hole drilled, regardless of its economic merit,
becomes a yard-stick, geologically, as the depths of all horizons
may be ascertained from the well log and can be compared with
depths of similar horizons in wells drilled in the same area. The
samples and cores of beds drilled can be studied and also compared with other well data. From this information, preferred
areas are located, which can be worked in detail by field methods.
The recent happy hunting ground for oil is in basins. Geologically, a basin is an area surrounded by up-lift barriers, such as
mountains, in which sediments have been deposited during the
past ages. Some of these areas are topographic basins even today;
however, many are indicated only by outcropping formations.
The current publications continually refer to new discoveries in
one basin or another.
For years, many geologists have thought the Denver basin
should produce. In the early 1920's the Wellington and Fort
Collins pools were discovered as a result of surface geology. These
pools are producing from folds in the rock formations directly
east of the front range of the Rockies. Production is from a
sandstone at a depth of about one mile. To date these two pools
have produced 8,200,000 barrels of oil and a considerable amount
of gas.
EXPLORATION INCREASES

The next discovery, and the last for several years, was the
Greasewood pool. Production at Greasewood is from a thin sandstone at a depth of 6300 feet. The first wells in this pool were
good producers (two have produced over 100,000 barrels each),
but subsequent tests were discouraging, as were the economic
conditions in the early 1930's, so, in spite of several concertedefforts, nothing productive happened in the basin until the spring
of 1948. The Ohio Oil Company had been quietly working in
southwestern Nebraska for several years, and made their first
discovery on the Egging farm northeast of Sidney. Russell Volk
of the Plains Exploration Company of Denver, has been active
in the area for years, and his efforts have surely contributed to
the developments on the Colorado side of the basin.
After the Ohio Oil Company's first discovery, most of the
major oil companies, and many independents, entered the area,
and several million acres of land were leased for prospecting.
At the present time there are 60 drilling rigs in the area, and
there are many seismograph crews working. Last year over 1600
crew weeks were spent in the basin. The area is now producing
around 8,000 barrels per day, in spite of adverse marketing conditions. The crude is classified as being "sweet oil" with very
little, if any, impurities, and is of high specific gravity. The oil
is being delivered to the refineries, or to the Stanolind Pipeline
at Bridgeport, Nebraska, by trucks. Transportation is costing
the producers and royalty owners from 25¢ a barrel up, depend-

